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Abstract Successful analysis of the models used in Model-
Driven Development requires the ability to synthesise the 
results of analysis and automatically integrate these results 
with the models themselves. This paper presents a 
reversible template language called XRound which 
supports round-trip transformations between models and 
the logic used to encode system properties. A template 
processor that supports the language is described, and the 
use of the template language is illustrated by its application 
in an analysis workbench, designed to support analysis of 
security properties of UML and MOF-based models. As a 
result of using reversible templates, it is possible to 
seamlessly and automatically integrate the results of a 
security analysis with a model. 
Keywords Model-Driven Development, Template 
Processing, UML, Security Analysis  
 
1. Introduction 
Transformations are a critical component of Model-
Driven Development, particularly in the Model-Driven 
Architecture (MDA) [1]. To this end, the 
Query/Views/Transformations (QVT) [2] standard has 
been developed, in order to provide a precise mechanism 
for describing  transformations between models.  
QVT transformations can be unidirectional (i.e., from 
one metamodel to a second not necessarily different 
metamodel) or bidirectional (i.e., reversible between two 
metamodels). The former is of critical importance in 
MDA, e.g., for transforming platform independent models 
(PIMs) into platform specific models (PSMs). The latter is 
vital for supporting round-trip engineering, and also 
rigorous analysis of models: the results of a logical 
analysis (e.g., correctness, timing analysis, security 
analysis) may need to be reflected in the source of a 
transformation. For example, a static analysis may be 
applied to a PSM, resulting in changes being made to that 
PSM. These changes may need to be reflected in the 
original PIM. 
Limited tool support currently exists for bidirectional 
transformations; key state of the art is summarised in 
Section 2. Bidirectional transformations can be awkwardly 
implemented by the sequential application of 
unidirectional transformations, but this is not entirely 
satisfactory because information – e.g., detailed 
representations of platforms, model element identities – 
may be lost after each unidirectional transformation is 
applied. This will particularly be the case with 
transformations that are reused from libraries in 
unexpected ways. More generally, it is difficult to ensure 
round-trip consistency in a sequence of unidirectional 
transformations. 
This paper describes a new template-based language, 
called XRound, for specifying bidirectional transformations 
between models of arbitrary languages. Moreover, the 
paper presents powerful tool support for this language that 
implements bidirectional transformations, particularly to 
support merging of the results of model analysis with an 
original model. XRound and its tool support are both 
illustrated in the context of a case study demonstrating a 
particular form of model analysis, namely security risk 
analysis (explained in Section 1.1). General lessons 
learned about model analysis and using XRound in the 
context of merging analysis results with models are also 
extracted and discussed. 
1.1 Context and contribution 
Given a model of a system, such as a Unified Modelling 
Language (UML) or Matlab/Simulink/Stateflow model, we 
can apply tools to analyse the model, to determine if it has 
desirable properties. A variety of analyses are possible and 
are used in practice, particularly consistency checking (e.g., 
does the information contained in one UML diagram 
contradict that contained in a second diagram), timing 
(e.g., is the worst-case execution time for a system 
satisfactory), failures (e.g., does the system mitigate for a 
particular class of fault) and security. We illustrate the use 
of XRound and bidirectional transformations in the context 
of security risk analysis in this paper. 
Security risk analysis is concerned with discovering 
threat paths in a system which allow potential attackers to 
access system assets. Concrete security objectives are in 
the form of specific unwanted outcomes to particular assets 
(e.g. integrity of particular data); however, the analysis 
process is forced to consider all possible threat paths to 
each asset, and this requires an efficient analytic tool.  
The basic idea behind any form of model analysis is as 
follows. A model (e.g., in UML) is annotated with 
properties. In the case of security risk analysis, the 
properties attached to a model are predicates: facts that are 
true, or that we wish to assert, about the model (examples 
follow in the sequel). These properties are collected by an 
analytic tool, which then processes them and returns 
results. The results of analysis may be additional properties 
that need to be integrated with the original model, e.g., 
new security requirements that have been added to control 
threats, failure modes for collections of components, 
worst-case execution time for a subsystem. This 
integration is generally quite difficult, especially because 
engineers may need to use different tools for modelling 
(e.g., a UML tool) and specialised analyses.  
The usual solution for lightweight tool integration of 
this form is template processing. A template processing 
system applies a template to a data model via a template 
processor, resulting in the extraction and formatting of the 
data for some particular application. An example of a 
template language is XSLT, which is used for transforming 
XML documents, usually into text or HTML.    
This is an attractive solution, since it allows designers to 
use their preferred modelling environment, and does not 
necessarily require a complete definition of the languages 
supported by that environment (e.g., a complete UML 
metamodel). It is also preferable from the tool software 
perspective; for example, type checking of properties can 
be implemented once within the analytic tool, rather than 
in each UML environment. It is also attractive from the 
perspective of compatibility with the traditional principles 
and practices of MDA and MDD. MDA, for example, 
operates in terms of application of model transformations 
to elaborate models, add platform details, remove details, 
and eventually generate code. Template processing is 
another mechanism for model transformation; in particular, 
when applied to security analysis (as we do in this paper), 
template processing supports the concept of in-place 
transformation, which updates a model to include new 
(security) information. Thus, a template processing 
approach to model analysis adds no additional complexity 
to typical MDA/MDD processes, and in addition helps to 
support domain experts (e.g., security engineers) in their 
efforts. 
Template processing provides an important bridge 
between different tools, but the currently available 
solutions are unable to support the reverse path of unifying 
the output data back into its original source. Round-trip 
engineering of analysis results back into the UML is 
therefore not straightforward with a conventional template 
processor, but is an important requirement for specialist 
analytic tools, 
XRound is designed to overcome this problem. Its 
objective is to maintain the advantages of template 
processing, including simple scripting of data 
transformations and independence between input and 
output applications, while supporting bidirectional 
transformations. This language and its supporting template 
processor allow model analysis tools to import Extensible 
Markup Language (XML) models with a source-specific 
metamodel, and re-generate the XML when the analysis 
model is changed. The security analysis workbench 
application described in Section 7 is one such application: 
a specialised analysis tool that imports UML models in the 
XML Metadata Interchange (XMI) format, and uses a 
bidirectional transformation to merge its results into the 
original XMI model.  
The contribution of this paper is to describe the XRound 
language, its motivation, its relationship with standard 
template processing, and how it supports bidirectional 
transformations via so-called reversible templates. 
Additionally, the implementation and use of the XRound 
language is shown to be feasible by presenting a 
supporting template processor and a practical application. 
XMLSource, a Java-based template processor for XRound, 
is described in both system and implementation terms, and 
the successful use of XRound in security analysis is 
discussed.  General lessons learned about supporting 
different kinds of model analysis are also synthesised in 
the conclusions. 
We commence with an overview of related work on 
transformations and model merging, and then in Section 3 
discuss the notion of a reversible template, which is at the 
foundation of XRound. The required processing for 
reversible templates is presented. Section 4 presents 
XRound itself, and Section 5 illustrates the language with 
several small examples. Section 6 summarises the template 
processor that supports XRound, and section 7 explains the 
use of XRound in supporting security analysis. We then 
discuss lessons learned, conclusions, and future work. 
2. Related Work 
There is substantial related work on model 
transformation, model merging, and template-based 
techniques that is relevant to the approach presented in this 
paper. We now review this work. 
2.1 Transformations 
Transformations are a critical component of Model-
Driven Development, particularly in the MDA [1]. The 
MOF (Meta-Object Facility) 2.0 QVT standard [2] has 
been developed in order to provide a precise, flexible 
mechanism for modelling transformations. QVT provides 
the means for declaratively capturing both unidirectional 
and bidirectional model transformations. These can be 
independent (i.e., the result model is not linked with the 
source model after transformation) or dependent. 
Dependent transformations aim at supporting a similar 
approach to the reversible templates applied in this paper; 
we are unaware of any QVT tool support for dependent 
transformations at this stage. QVT aims to support a 
variety of scenarios for transformation. Regeneration and 
reconciliation of transformation results is most similar to 
what is intended for the reversible templates we present. 
Tools for supporting transformations have been 
developed. Of note amongst these are the Atlas 
Transformation Language (ATL) [3], XMF-Mosaic [4], 
Yet-Another Transformation-Language (YATL) [5], 
VIATRA2 [6] and Epsilon [7]. These languages and tools 
are all targeted at Model Driven Development. There are 
also transformation tools outside of the Object 
Management Group (OMG) standards; for example, the 
TXL [8] framework has some similarities to QVT, though 
it has been predominantly targeted at programming 
language transformation. In this sense, TXL has some 
similarities to the model-to-text proposals, such as 
MOFScript [9]. 
The generative programming community has made use 
of template-based techniques to implement transformations 
[10], and tools have emerged, including Velocity [11] or 
Java Emitter Templates (JET) [12]. These are generally 
unidirectional transformations aimed at minimizing the 
amount of code that needs to be rewritten in a code 
generation process. 
Tratt's Converge meta-programming language [13] has 
also been used successfully to implement a transformation 
language, in this case as a domain-specific language.  Tratt 
also describes a change propagating transformation, also 
implemented using Converge, wherein updates made to the 
source model are automatically propagated to the target 
model. A similar approach to change propagating 
transformations is considered by Alanen and Porres in their 
Coral system [14]. They describe their tool architecture in 
detail, focusing on its activation mechanisms, which have 
some similarity to the architecture of the template engine 
described in this paper. 
Hu et al describe a programmable editor for developing 
structured documents (typically XML) based on 
bidirectional transformations [15]. Their intent is to allow 
operations to be applied to a document view, and to have 
an editor automatically derive a consistent document 
source along with a transformation to produce the view. In 
this manner, consistency is guaranteed by construction. 
They define a new (declarative) language for describing 
transformation rules, and implement a view updating 
scheme (similar to those from the database community) 
which reflects view modifications on the underlying 
repository. 
2.2 Model merging 
A model management operation related to 
transformation is model merging (sometimes referred to as 
model composition, weaving, or unification). Merging 
models is the process of integrating two or more models – 
often representing parts of the same system – into a 
unified, consistent, single model. Model merging is related 
to database schema merging. A generic approach to model 
merging was described by Pottinger [16]. Approaches to 
model merging targeted at Model-Driven Development 
have begun to appear. The Atlas Model Weaver (AMW) 
[17], which makes use of ATL, is one of the first generic 
prototypes. It makes use of a weaving model to describe 
correspondences between model elements (e.g., which 
elements are to be merged). The Epsilon Merging 
Language (EML) is a rule-based language which allows 
models to be compared (to identify correspondences), and 
elements to be thereafter merged [7]. Pierce et al’s [18] 
research on data synchronisation is strongly related to 
model merging and composition, as it focuses on the more 
general problem of synchronising XML documents via bi-
directional transformations. It is targeted specifically at 
efforts to ensure view consistency for tree-structured data, 
but does not propose a concrete language for 
transformations and updates, nor has it been applied 
directly to security analysis. By contrast, the work in the 
DEGAS project explored security analysis in the context of 
the Choreographer platform [19], but they did not present a 
concrete transformation language as well. 
Model merging could be used to solve the problem of 
combining the results of an analysis of models with the 
models themselves. For example, a set of EML rules could 
be written that identify where the results of analysis should 
be inserted into a source model, and a second set of rules 
written that describe the results of the merging process. 
The main difference between the approach offered by 
model merging, and the approach in this paper, is that any 
such merging rules will focus on integrating the results of 
analysis with source models. The approach we present in 
this paper allows one set of templates to be written which 
support both source-to-target generation (i.e., producing a 
model to be analyzed) and target-to-source generation. 
Conceptually, using a model merging approach and using 
reversible templates are equivalent.  
2.3 Security analysis 
There has been some related work on model-based 
security analysis, beyond what we have mentioned in 
Sections 2.1 and 2.2. 
Related to model merging and model transformation is 
aspect-oriented modeling and weaving. Models of cross-
cutting concerns (called aspects) are woven with system 
models via an automated process. The application of 
aspect-oriented modeling to security analysis is considered 
by Petriu et al [20] and Houmb et al [21]. These 
approaches differ from the work presented in this paper by 
focusing more on the development of security artifacts and 
supporting analysis, rather than being able to reflect the 
results of analysis in system models. 
Breu et al consider security analysis in the context of 
MDA [22]. They model security requirements using UML 
diagrams and focus on using transformations to generate 
security artefacts for web services systems. Jurjens [23] 
has presented an approach to building security-critical 
systems using UML, and provides tool support for 
automated verification. Brændeland [24] has explored 
security analysis for component-based systems. The focus 
of the work in this paper is more on the infrastructure 
needed to support different kinds of security analysis 
without being restricted to specific tools and metamodels, 
on supporting the analysis of security risk in the system 
design process, rather than reasoning about security 
functionality, and on being able to support reflection of the 
results of analysis automatically in models.  
3. Processing Overview 
This section introduces the key concepts behind a 
reversible template, and then describes how the required 
processing functions motivate the overall structure of the 
template language. 
3.1 The system context 
The original motivation for reversible template 
processing was to enable the analysis and round-trip 
updating of XMI representations of UML models produced 
using proprietary design tools. However, the template 
processor and the XRound language are general XML 
transformation tools, a typical application of which is 
shown in Fig 1. 
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Fig. 1 Reversible template processing architecture 
 
In Fig 1, an application is required to process and 
modify an XML model, which is normally managed by a 
proprietary tool. The application could directly manage the 
reference XML document, but this would dedicate the 
application to a proprietary metamodel.  The purpose of 
the reversible transformation is to decouple the application 
from the tool-specific metamodel, by specifying a template 
which allows the application to import elements of the 
XML model, and also update that model to be consistent 
with changes made by the application.  
One benefit of using a template, as opposed to 
automating the transformation between two meta-models, 
is that only partial metamodels need to be specified; in 
other words, only the elements of the proprietary model 
required for the application need to be understood. The 
benefit of using a single template to specify a bidirectional 
transformation is consistency: only a single document is 
needed to specify the relationship between the application 
and the proprietary metamodel. 
The relationship between the template processor and the 
application is an application programming interface (API), 
in which the application is a client of the template 
processor.  Facts about the model are predicates, which are 
exchanged between the template processor (see section 6, 
below) and the application. 
Three main functions must be supported by the template 
processor; they are: 
• validation: to check that the format of the XML 
document is compatible with the supplied XRound 
template; 
• import: to read the XML document, and provide the 
application with the predicates specified in the template; 
and 
• export: to update the XML document to be consistent 
with predicates held by the application. 
One implementation of the template processor is 
described in section 6; the following sections describe the 
principles of reversible templates in more detail.  
3.2 Bidirectional Transformations and Model 
Unification 
Template processing is usually a one-way operation as 
shown in Fig. 2: the template processor locates elements in 
the input tree and publishes them, suitably formatted.  
In the case of XML data, the input to the template 
processor is a tree; the output may be XML, or it may be 
published in another format such as text or HTML. 
Conventional templates are capable of expressing arbitrary 
computation, but their fundamental structure is still to 
navigate to selected nodes in the input tree, extract 
information, and produce suitably formatted output. The 
benefit of a template over a standard programming 
language is usually that it is tailored to the particular type 
of input and output required. 
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Fig. 2 Conventional template processing 
Reversible templates defined in XRound are similar in 
structure to existing templates, but encapsulate a 
fundamentally different type of operation: unification. The 
operation of a reversible template is shown in Fig. 3. 
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Fig. 3 The template unification process 
A reversible template navigates to elements in the input 
tree, in a similar way to a conventional template, but it also 
references values that are shared with the application. The 
fundamental operation is to match, or unify, values in the 
source tree with values in an application predicate. 
Unification allows values to be determined from either the 
source tree, or the application predicate, or if values are set 
in both, to ensure that they are consistent. For example, in 
Fig. 3 the first value is not known in the source, but is 
available in a predicate; the opposite is true for the second 
value; and the third is the same in both source and 
predicate, so this unification succeeds.  
The underlying unification process determines the 
design of the template language; each part of the template 
identifies a unification slot, and the fundamental operation 
is ‘match’, which is to unify the slot with either the XML 
input tree, or the application predicate.  
Unification is conceptually straightforward, but 
designing a template language that exploits this process 
does present some problems, including:   
• The source navigation for a reversible processor is not 
quite the same as a conventional template processor, 
because is has to unify input nodes that do not exist. For 
example, in Fig. 3 it is not simply the case that the input 
node does not have the first value set, but that the whole 
node (A.1.1) is missing. The template language must 
allow the programmer to specify which nodes are 
allowed to be missing, and which areas in the source 
tree are fixed. In XRound, nodes that may be missing 
are marked as mutable, and can be created by the 
template processor. 
• Because either nodes in the input tree, or attributes 
within nodes, may be missing, it is not always possible 
to select nodes based on an attribute value, as in an 
Xpath [25] expression; it is necessary to unify nodes 
that are present while certain attribute values within the 
node are missing. In XRound this problem is solved by 
a general constraint mechanism, which constrains 
unification slots to specified values. Constraints are also 
unified as part of the matching process and can 
therefore be used to specify the types of predicate that 
can be generated, constrain XML node selection, and 
determine application predicates to be unified. 
The underlying unification process determines some 
features that are needed in a reversible template language: 
the specification of unification slots and constraints. The 
next section describes template processing functions, and 
how they are supported. 
3.3 Template Processing 
This section describes the operation of template 
processing in sufficient detail to motivate the clause 
structure of the XRound template language.  Section 6 
describes the template processor in more detail.   
The previous section described template-based 
unification, and this places some requirements on the top-
level sections of the template language, which are known 
as the clauses. Essentially a clause must: 
• specify a number of unification slots; 
• allow the specification of constraining values for each 
slot; and 
• unify values in the XML input and/or in application 
predicates with slot values and constraints. 
In order to allow for a separate verification section, and 
also to allow the user to distinguish parts of the XML input 
that should be fixed, as opposed to those that may be 
rewritten, three types of clause are defined in XRound: 
• validate 
• structure 
• roundtrip 
A validate clause specifies validation checks, a 
structure clause references elements of the XML input that 
should not be modified, and a roundtrip clause includes 
input nodes that may be modified when the XML is 
regenerated from application predicates. The value of the 
structure clause is that it allows some performance 
optimisations compared to roundtrip clauses, because it 
does not have to account for missing nodes. However, it is 
not the case that all nodes visited by roundtrip clauses can 
or should be re-written; nodes that can be updated are 
specifically identified in XRound by a mutable attribute. 
The three processing functions described in section 3.1 
are now described: 
Validation. Validation can be used to make any checks that 
the programmer requires, but its primary aim is to ensure 
that the template and the XML input are compatible. A 
particular template will apply to a limited range of source 
tools and versions; validation clauses in the template are 
used to make any measurements on the XML input data 
that are necessary to check that XML document is 
compatible with the template. 
After the XML input and the template have been 
successfully opened and parsed, each validate clause is 
executed, and each must succeed for the validation to 
succeed. No other clauses are executed during validation, 
and the validation clauses are not executed as part of any 
other processing. 
Import. The import operation is similar to normal template 
processing, it is used to assemble predicates from the XML 
input and provide them to the client application. 
Any structure clauses are first executed, followed by 
roundtrip clauses.  Each clause is unified with constraints 
specified within the clause, but not with any application 
predicates. The clauses have one or more publish attributes 
that mark completion; when these are reached the 
unification slots within the clause are checked and, if 
complete, a predicate is exported to the client.  
Export. The export operation merges predicates from the 
client application back into the XML input, then saves the 
result. The purpose of the operation is to update the XML 
representation with any changes that have been made by 
the application, without the need for the application to 
manage the specific XML metamodel, and without the 
need to write different templates for input and output 
processing. 
The first processing stage executes all the structure 
clauses in the template; although this will not result in any 
updates to the XML output, it is necessary because it may 
build reference information that is used later (see 
Performance Management, below).  There are two further 
processing stages, the second removes mutable nodes, 
assuming that nodes no longer present in the application 
have been deleted intentionally, and the third re-builds 
nodes from the application predicates. In both cases, the 
operation (remove, build) takes place only for mutable 
nodes that have been encountered during a successful 
unification of a roundtrip template clause. The values 
written to the rebuilt nodes are obtained from the 
unification slots in the template, and so may contain values 
from the application predicates, from the XML input, and 
from clause constraints. 
 In summary, the process that allows a template to be 
interpreted in both directions is unification; this has 
implications for the types of navigation that can be carried 
out within a template and determines the need for other 
structure in each clause: unification slots and constraints. 
The three key operations of validation, import and export 
are supported by the clause structure in XRound, allowing 
the programmer to specify validation checks (validate), 
elements of the XML that should not change (structure), 
and parts of the XML model that may be modified 
(roundtrip). 
4. The XRound Language 
This section describes the complete XRound language. 
It begins by describing how an XRound template is 
organised in terms of clauses and how they support 
unification slots, constraints, and transformations. This is 
followed by a discussion of other types of constraint, and 
additional language features, including those that support 
performance management and debugging. 
4.1  Basic Template Structure 
The top-level structure of the template language is given 
in the abbreviated XML Document Type Definition (DTD) 
in Table 1.  
 
 
Table 1 Abbreviated XRound Document Type Description 
<!ELEMENT tpl.template ((tpl.validate|tpl.structure|tpl.roundtrip)* )> 
 
<!ELEMENT tpl.validate ((tpl. declare|tpl.constraint)*,tpl.specification+)>  
<!ATTLIST tpl.validate  length  CDATA #IMPLIED  
         auxLength CDATA #IMPLIED> 
 
<!ELEMENT tpl.stucture ((tpl. declare|tpl.constraint)*,tpl.specification+)> 
          
<!ELEMENT tpl.roundtrip  
 ((tpl. declare|tpl.constraint|tpl.uniqueName)*,tpl.specification+)> 
 
<!ELEMENT tpl.declare> 
<!ATTLIST tpl.declare  position  CDATA #REQUIRED> 
         name  CDATA #REQUIRED> 
 
<!ELEMENT tpl.constraint (tpl.value+)> 
<!ATTLIST tpl.constraint position  CDATA #REQUIRED> 
 
<!ELEMENT tpl.uniqueName (tpl.value+)> 
<!ATTLIST tpl.uniqueName position  CDATA #REQUIRED> 
 
<!ELEMENT tpl.value (#PCDATA)> 
… 
 
An XRound template is a well-formed XML document 
containing three node types that may occur in any number 
and any order: tpl.validate, tpl.structure and tpl.roundtrip. 
These are the clauses introduced in the previous section. 
Attributes in each clause node specify the number of 
unification slots (length + auxLength), which may be 
indexed as an array in the subsequent template (e.g. 
position = “0”). The slots are divided into two types, the 
first (specified by length) are mapped directly to an 
application predicate; the second (specified by auxLength) 
are auxiliary variables used during template processing.  It 
is necessary to index the predicate as an array, to ensure 
that the order is specified for the application; however, it is 
also possible refer to unification slots by name, for the 
purpose of readability. This is the purpose of the 
tpl.declare statement, which may occur within any of the 
three main node types. The scope of such a declaration is 
the node (template clause) in which it occurs, and it allows 
any attribute that would specify a unification slot number 
to use the declared name as an alternative (e.g. position = 
“UML_CLASS”). 
Each clause may have any number of constraints; each 
constraint has a position attribute that specifies the 
associated unification slot, and a number of values.   
Because the round trip process can generate nodes that 
were not previously part of the XML input, it is sometimes 
necessary to generate new unique names. For example, 
unique identifiers (xmi.id) may be needed for UML 
elements in XMI models. tpl.uniqueName specifies that a 
unification slot will be filled with a unique name that is 
generated by the template processor, if it is not otherwise 
defined by the unification process.  
A clause therefore specifies the unification space, or 
number of slots, and gives constrained values to those 
slots. One or more specification nodes in each clause 
determine the correspondence between the XML input and 
unification slots in the template, and hence the application 
predicates. 
The remainder of the language is presented as constructs 
and examples, rather than a DTD; this is because 
specification nodes may quote from the DTD of the source 
XML document, modified with additional optional 
attributes; the resulting DTD for the XRound would 
therefore either be application specific, or unhelpfully 
contain extensive provision for “any” nodes.  
4.2 Template Specifications 
A template specification is well-formed XML; unlike 
some template languages it follows a tree structure, rather 
than a sequence. Depth in the tree indicates subsequent 
operations and breadth allows the specification of 
alternatives. There are three types of node in a template 
specification: Source Nodes, Navigation Nodes, and 
Matching Nodes.  Certain XRound attributes may appear 
in more than one type of node, so these will be summarised 
before specification nodes are described. 
4.2.1 Generic Attributes 
Generic attributes may appear in several different node 
types; they are used to control the behaviour of the 
template processor.  
A publish attribute can appear anywhere in a 
specification tree, and its effect is to test if unification is 
complete, and if so mark that result as successful. Table 2 
illustrates the use of this attribute. 
Table 2 The publish attribute 
<first> 
 <second publish=”TRUE”/> 
 <third> 
  <fourth publish=”TRUE”/> 
</third></first> 
 
The specification in Table 2 would find all instances of 
first…second and first…third…fourth that unified. (first, 
etc, are not of course valid node names.)   
A tpl.mutable attribute specifies that the sub-tree 
beneath the node in which this attribute is set can be 
removed or re-written when predicates from the client 
application are exported back into the XML document. 
This attribute may only occur in source or navigation 
nodes, within roundtrip clauses; Section 5.2 provides an 
example that illustrates the use of tpl.mutable.  
Two other attributes may appear anywhere within an 
XRound template, they are tpl.debug and tpl.message. 
Their primary function is for template debugging, and their 
use is described in section 4.5, below. 
4.2.2 Source Nodes 
Source nodes name a node type in the XML input 
document. They cause the template to evaluate all nodes of 
that name from the current position in the XML document. 
A typical template is therefore interspersed with node 
names from the source document, together with statements 
specific to the template language. 
4.2.3 Navigation nodes 
The XRound language supports four types of navigation 
statement: 
• select: evaluate all nodes with a given name; 
• selectfromChildren: evaluate child nodes; 
• moveUp: move up in the XML document tree; and 
• selectRegisteredNode: evaluate registered nodes. 
Selection statements result in the evaluation of all the 
selected nodes. The selectRegisteredNodes statement is 
concerned with performance management, which is 
discussed in section 4.4, below; examples of the other three 
statements are given in Table 3. 
Table 3 Navigation statements  
<tpl.select node="UML:ClassifierRole"> 
 
<tpl.selectFromChildren    
 node="UML:AssociationEnd"  
 position="0"> 
 
<tpl.moveUp steps="2”> 
 
A tpl.select node evaluates all nodes in the input tree 
with the specified node name; the example in Table 3 
selects all UML:ClassifierRole nodes in the XML input 
document. 
A tpl.selectFromChildren node selects child nodes from 
the present position in a specified order. Each occurrence 
of tpl.selectFromChildren specifies the position (i.e. index) 
and name of the child node to be selected. In this example 
the first occurrence of a UML:AssociationEnd node is 
selected. Note that there is no need for the template 
language to have a named statement that evaluates all child 
nodes of a given name, since that function is provided by 
directly quoting a source node. 
The tpl.moveUp node moves the present position in the 
XML document tree up by the specified number of steps.  
4.2.4 Matching Nodes 
There is a single match node, tpl.match,  within the 
template language; it instructs the template processor to 
unify an element in the XML input tree with the specified 
unification slot, any previously specified constraints, and 
depending upon the process mode, a predicate retrieved 
from the client application. The type of matching carried 
out is controlled by the nodeType attribute, which may take 
one of four values: 
• TEXT_NODE 
• ATTRIBUTE_NODE 
• MULTIPLE_TEXT 
• MULTIPLE_ATTRIBUTE 
Text matching unifies with a text node, and attribute 
matching unifies with a selected attribute from the current 
node. Multiple matching parses a given text element or 
attribute into components, and unifies with one of the 
components. Table 4 gives examples of the four matching 
options. 
 
Each tpl.match node specifies the index of the 
unification slot that must be matched (position), as either 
an index or a declared name. The relationship between the 
unification slots and the client predicates is fixed, so this 
does not need to be specified separately. The node to be 
matched from the XML input is always the current node, 
reached by the last navigation. The first two match types 
unify the value of node text data, or an attribute by name, 
respectively. The ‘multiple’ variants add the ability to 
decompose an XML value into components, and match one 
of those components with a unification slot. 
A multiple text or attribute node type unifies one value 
in a list of separated values. These are used in situations 
where the XML text string (text node or attribute) is 
composite, and must be decomposed for the application. 
For example, given the attribute myLunch=”fish,chips”, 
the example above would correctly match the number of 
values in the attribute (length=”2 “) and attempt to unify 
the value ‘chips’ (tagIndex=”1”) with the template slot 3.  
One use of this feature is to pack and unpack UML tags 
with compound value elements, recorded in XMI as single 
text nodes. 
This is the core of the reversible template language. 
Other language features include additional forms of 
constraint, and the support of performance management 
and debugging. These will be discussed in the following 
sections, after which the core language will be illustrated 
with worked examples.  
4.3 Further types of Constraint 
The primary means of constraining processing is via 
constrained unification. (See Sections 3.2 and 4.)  In brief, 
tpl.constraint may be used to specify a list of values for a 
unification slot. Any valid entries for the slot must be 
consistent with the corresponding value in the XML 
document, the value in the application predicate, and also 
take one of the specified constraint values.  
There are two other types of constraint supported by 
XRound:  
• selection by a constant, which avoids the need to use 
auxiliary unification slots just to specify constants; and  
• constraint matching, which allows more complex 
constraints than can be achieved using the primary 
constraint mechanism.
Table 4 Matching Options 
<tpl.match  nodeType="TEXT_NODE" position="0"> 
 
<tpl.match  nodeType="ATTRIBUTE_NODE" attribute="name" position="1"> 
 
<tpl.match  nodeType="MULTIPLE_TEXT" tagIndex="1“ length="2“ position="3" > 
 
<tpl.match  nodeType="MULTIPLE_ATTRIBUTE" attribute="myLunch“ tagIndex="1“ length="2“  
  position="3" > 
 
Table 5 Constraint by a constant 
<tpl.roundtrip length="1" auxLength="1"> 
<tpl.declare position="1" name=”constrain_true”> 
<tpl.constraint position="1"> 
    <tpl.value>true</tpl.value> 
</tpl.constraint> 
... 
<tpl.match  nodeType="TEXT_NODE" position="constrain_true"> 
 
---- alternatively --- 
 
<tpl.match  nodeType="TEXT_NODE" text="true"> 
 
4.3.1 Selection by a constant 
It is feasible to specify a constant using an auxiliary 
unification slot; however, there are cases where constraint 
by a constant is an aid to template readability. The syntax 
is to replace the position attribute in a match statement, 
with text=”value”, as shown in Table 5. 
Table 5 illustrates two ways of ensuring that a text node 
has the value ‘true’. In the first an additional unification 
slot is declared, given a meaningful name, and constrained 
to the value ‘true’; the slot is then referenced as required. 
The second uses constraint by a constant, in which the 
value is specified as needed. Even without the name 
declaration, the first is considerably longer. Of course, 
writing constants where they are needed is not always the 
best programming practice, and either can be used as 
appropriate. This is essentially a syntactic shortcut, which 
does not modify the underlying unification mechanism; 
however, it cannot be used where a specific unification slot 
is necessary; for example, to share a constant such as a 
predicate name with the application. 
XML documents often include elements of the form 
name=”nnn”  value=”vvv”; where the name of interest to 
the application is a constant, this form of constraint is 
particularly effective in this case.  
4.3.2 Constraint Matching 
The unification process described in Section 3.2 
constrains unification slots independently; however, there 
are instances where it is necessary to accommodate 
dependencies between variables.  
For example, consider the need to check tool names and 
version numbers to verify that a template is able to process 
the supplied XML; for example, a template may be able to 
accommodate XML generated from the tools and versions 
given in Table 6. 
 
 
 
Table 6 Example of pair-wise constraints 
tool = “uml_A”    version = “1.2” 
tool = “uml_A”    version  = “1.2a” 
tool = “xmi_uml”   version  = “15” 
 
The core language would be able to extract the tool 
name and constrain it to uml_A or xmi_uml, and similarly 
extract the version number. However, an additional form 
of constraint is needed to correlate the tool to its version. 
This is achieved by index matching, which specifies that 
two unification slots must be matched by a constraint at the 
same position in each constraint list. The syntax is given in 
Table 7: 
Table 7 Index matching syntax 
<tpl.matchConstraintIndex  
 position="..."  
 position2="..."> 
 
The two positions index unification slots, as usual, and 
the constraint specifies that the two slots must be filled 
with constraints from the same position in each constraint 
array. For example, the template in Table 8 implements the 
version checking requirement in Table 6. 
The match statements in Table 8 unify the selected 
attributes with the possible values for tool and version, and 
the additional matchConstraintIndex test ensures that only 
valid pairs of values are permitted.   
Although this function is limited to pairwise 
comparisons, it can be used to implement constraints of 
any order. 
Table 8 Version checking template 
<tpl.validate auxLength="2"> 
<tpl.constraint position="0"> 
 <tpl.value> uml_A </tpl.value> 
 <tpl.value> uml_A </tpl.value> 
 <tpl.value> xmi_uml </tpl.value> 
</tpl.constraint> 
<tpl.constraint position="1"> 
    <tpl.value> 1.2 </tpl.value> 
 <tpl.value> 1.2a </tpl.value> 
 <tpl.value> 15 </tpl.value> 
</tpl.constraint> 
<tpl.specification> 
 ... 
   <tpl.match nodeType="ATTRIBUTE_NODE" attribute=”tool” position="0"> 
   <tpl.match nodeType="ATTRIBUTE_NODE" attribute=”version” position="1"> 
   <tpl.matchConstraintIndex  
  position="0" position2="1"> 
   ... 
 
4.4 Performance Management 
The main performance problem in template processing 
is the need to repeatedly scan all the nodes in a document. 
This problem can be seen in the roundtrip example in 
Table 13, in Section 5.2, below. A reference to an xmi.id is 
obtained from a node of interest, but in order to find the 
class name that corresponds to the reference it is necessary 
to scan the entire document for UML:Class nodes. Since 
Classes are in user-defined packages they can occur at any 
level of the XMI hierarchy, so it is not feasible to limit the 
search size by navigating from the tree root. 
The types of node that are revisited in this way are often 
a relatively limited number of fixed design points; in the 
UML example these are primarily the classes and objects. 
If it were possible to simply remember the location of 
these nodes then these auxiliary searches could be made 
much more efficient. This, quite simply, is what the 
performance management statements in XRound 
implement. There are two statements, one that records 
fixed points, and one that navigates to previously recorded 
nodes. The syntax for these statements is given in Table 9. 
Table 9 Performance management syntax 
<tpl.registerNode/> 
.... 
<tpl.selectRegisteredNode  
    node="..."> 
 
The registerNode statement records the current node, 
and the selectRegisteredNode statement can then be used 
to search just those nodes that have been registered for a 
given node type. 
In the example of Section 5.2, each UML:Class could 
be registered, allowing the set to be revisited later without 
the need to search the entire document tree. Instead of 
searching the document tree with a select statement, the 
selectRegisteredNode could be used; the result is the same, 
but considerably faster.  
The only restriction on the use of these statements is 
that mutable nodes cannot be registered, and that nodes 
must be registered before they can be selected. Clauses in 
the template are executed in order, so normal practice is to 
register nodes in early structure clauses; these nodes can 
then be referenced in the remainder of the template.  
The value of these performance features is model and 
template specific. However, the parsing performance of a 
real system model indicates the effectiveness of node 
registration. The system design used for test purposes is a 
high level model of an industrial distributed system, which 
was analyzed using the security analysis application 
described in Section 7 [26].  The size of the UML model1, 
and comparative parsing times2, are given in Table 10. 
Table 10. Example of performance management benefit 
Model Characteristics 
XML File Size 1.9 MB
Total Number of Classes 142 
Total Number of Associations 296 
Template Processing Performance 
Elapsed time with registered classes 2.1 s 
Elapsed time without registered classes 36.4 s 
Additional complete model searches 
without registered classes 
751 
 
The template used to process this model registers only 
the class nodes, and this simple strategy results in a 
substantial performance benefit (from 36.4 seconds to 2.1 
seconds). A select operation, as opposed to a 
selectRegisteredNode operation, forces the template 
processor to check every node in the model for the 
specified attribute (e.g. class name), and without 
                                                          
1 The number of classes and associations in table 1 are slightly 
higher than those that may be inferred from the published case 
study [26]; the difference is that these are for the whole model, 
not just the system design elements discussed in the study.  
2 Measured on a 2.81 GHz Pentium 4-based machine with 1GB of 
RAM. 
registration this results in 751 additional full model 
searches. A major contribution to this cost is the 
processing of associations; when an association is 
encountered, the template references the class at each end 
to obtain class names from the xmi.id attributes specified in 
the association node. A similar operation is required to 
associate tags with classes. Not all templates would need to 
dereference IDs in this way, but this is a relatively 
common requirement, and the performance management 
features described here make these dereferencing 
operations much more economical. 
4.5 Debugging 
Finally, there are two important features in the language 
that aid template debugging: message and debug attributes, 
which are generic attributes that can be added to any node. 
Their syntax is given in Table 11. 
Table 11 Generic debugging attributes 
tpl.message=”.. message text ..” 
 
tpl.debug=”TRUE” 
 
The message attribute can be included in any node, and 
sets a message for the template tree below that node. If any 
errors are issued during the processing of that template 
sub-tree, then the message will be included in the error 
report. It is good programming practice to include 
messages in every clause header; they provide useful 
comments and invaluable narrowing of the problem space 
when an error is reported.  
The debug attribute is not intended to be a permanent 
feature of a template. Whenever a node is encountered 
with this attribute, the following information is printed: 
• the current message (see above); 
• the current predicate, which may not be fully defined; 
• the template node that requested the printout; 
• attributes of the template node; 
• the current document node; and 
• the attributes of the current document node. 
This provides a compact summary of the current status 
of the template processor, and is sufficiently informative to 
trace the behaviour of a template without needing the 
complete processor status; in particular, it allows the 
unification process to be monitored. In practice, however, 
this level of detail is rarely required; it is often sufficient to 
know that a particular node in the template is reached.  
When a template fails, the most common problem is 
detecting the node that failed to match the document, so 
the most common use of this debugging feature is to probe 
where a template succeeds or fails. 
5 Examples 
This section provides three examples of template 
clauses, which demonstrate how well the template 
language is able to hide round-trip processing complexity. 
The examples are drawn from templates that support 
roundtrip analysis of the security of UML system models, 
where the UML design tool uses XMI as its export format.  
The first two examples illustrate structure and roundtrip 
clauses; the third is a roundtrip clause for the same 
application, but a different source metamodel. 
5.1 A structure clause 
Table 12 presents a complete structure clause, which 
extracts UML Class names with given stereotypes. 
There are two unification slots in the template, and these 
correspond directly to a client predicate with two values. 
The constraint section of this clause limits the first slot 
position to the values ‘data’ or ‘service’. 
 
 
Table 12 A structure clause 
<tpl.structure length="2"> 
  <tpl.constraint position="0"> 
    <tpl.value>data</tpl.value> 
    <tpl.value>service</tpl.value> 
  </tpl.constraint> 
  <tpl.specification> 
    <tpl.select node="UML:Class"> 
    <tpl.match nodeType="ATTRIBUTE_NODE" attribute="name" position="1"> 
    <UML:ModelElement.stereotype> 
    <UML:Stereotype> 
    <tpl.match nodeType="ATTRIBUTE_NODE" attribute="name" position="0" publish="TRUE"/> 
                                     
</UML:Stereotype></UML:ModelElement.stereotype></tpl.match></tpl.select> 
</tpl.specification></tpl.structure>
Table 13 Mutable document nodes 
<!—Slots:      (tagname      1st_value className   2nd_value)  (xmi.id)        --> 
<!—Client use: (PermitAccess fromClass  inClass   toOperation)                 --> 
 
<tpl.roundtrip length="4" auxLength="1" tpl.message=”Processing Access Controls”> 
  <tpl.declare position=”0” name=”PERMIT_ACCESS”/> 
  <tpl.declare position=”1” name=”VAL_1”/> 
  <tpl.declare position=”2” name=”IN_CLASS”/> 
  <tpl.declare position=”3” name=”VAL_2”/> 
  <tpl.declare position=”4” name=”XMI.ID”/> 
  <tpl.constraint position="PERMIT_ACCESS"> 
    <tpl.value>PermitAccess</tpl.value> 
  </tpl.constraint> 
  … 
<tpl.specification> 
  ... 
  <UML:TaggedValue tpl.mutable="TRUE"> 
  <tpl.match nodeType="ATTRIBUTE_NODE" attribute="tag" position="PERMIT_ACCESS"> 
  <tpl.match nodeType="MULTIPLE_ATTRIBUTE" attribute="value" tagIndex="0"  
        length="2" position=”VAL_1”> 
  <tpl.match nodeType="MULTIPLE_ATTRIBUTE" attribute="value" tagIndex="1"  
        length="2" position=”VAL_2” > 
  <tpl.match nodeType="ATTRIBUTE_NODE" attribute="modelElement" position=”XMI.ID” > 
    <tpl.selectNode node="UML:Class"> 
    <tpl.match nodeType="ATTRIBUTE_NODE" attribute="xmi.id" position=”XMI.ID”> 
    <tpl.match nodeType="ATTRIBUTE_NODE" attribute="name" position=”IN_CLASS”  
   publish="TRUE"> 
  … 
The specification searches all the nodes in the XML 
input for UML:Class nodes. For each node of this type it 
extracts the name attribute, which is unified with the 
second unification slot. The template then searches child 
nodes for the stereotype (UML:ModelElement.stereotype 
/UML:Stereotype) and unifies the attribute name of the 
stereotype with first unification slot. Of course, this slot is 
constrained, so the only values that succeed are ‘data’ or 
‘service’. The effect of this clause, therefore, is to search 
the XML input for UML:Class nodes with a stereotype of 
‘data’ or ‘service’ and, depending on mode, publish 
predicates of the form (data|service,name).  The form of 
this template is very similar to other template languages, 
demonstrating that although reversible templates are 
theoretically quite different to conventional templates, their 
programming form can be made familiar. 
Although the structure of the XRound language is a full 
XML tree, the normal page layout of the template is 
procedural, except in sections where the tree structure 
needs to be exposed.  This aids comprehension for those 
familiar with other template languages. 
5.2 Mutable nodes 
The specification of mutable nodes is essentially the 
same; Table 13 shows part of a roundtrip template clause 
for the same application. 
The comments at the start of this extract describe the 
use of the unification slots, and the resulting application 
predicate; these names are then declared as aliases for the 
slot positions and later used to define positions. This 
template matches an XMI tag, which references a UML 
class. The name of the tag is PermitAccess and the tag 
value has two separated components (e.g. PermitAccess = 
”subject,object”). The application predicate contains the 
same information as the tag, but also includes the name of 
the class in which the tag was declared (inClass). The first 
four template slots correspond to the values in the 
application predicate, and the fifth is used for the xmi.id 
which references the UML class. The header to this clause 
specifies the number of unification slots, and constrains the 
first to the single value ‘PermitAccess’. Note that since this 
constrained value is part of the predicate exchanged with 
the application, the use of constants, as described in section 
4.3.1, is not appropriate.  
The specification navigates directly from the document 
root (XMI) to a tagged value, which is marked as mutable. 
This specifies that any tagged values that match this clause 
will be re-written on export. This navigation identifies all 
possible tagged values, but only those that unify as far as 
the ‘publish’ attribute at the end of this fragment will be 
rewritten. 
The next three match statements unify the three 
elements of the tag (name plus two values) with their 
respective slots. An important feature of this language is 
that these statements are able to extract data from the XML 
source and publish them to the client application, and also 
obtain predicates from the client and update the XML 
source, depending upon the operational mode of the 
template processor.  
The fourth match operation unifies the modelElement 
attribute value with an auxiliary slot in the unification 
template (i.e. one that is not part of the application client’s 
predicate). This value is the xmi.id of the class to which the 
tag is related; selectNode then navigates to the 
corresponding class by selecting all the class nodes in the 
XML input, and selecting the one with the correct xmi.id. 
This involves searching the entire input tree in order to 
dereference a single xmi.id; a more economical approach is 
described in section 4.4. 
The final match statement unifies the class name 
associated with this xmi.id with the third template slot. At 
this point the publish attribute tests if the unification 
process is complete, causing publication to the client, or 
the addition of a node to the XMI document, depending 
upon the direction of processing.  
In order to write a template, such as the fragment in 
table 13, it is necessary to understand the relevant parts of 
the source metamodel, and the predicates required by the 
application. However, the programmer’s view of the 
process is one of selecting model elements, and specifying 
how predicates are assembled; these are essentially the 
only operations that are exposed. This is therefore very 
similar to standard template processing, where the template 
specifies location and format. The only features in this 
fragment that indicate that it is reversible are ‘mutable’ 
attributes, which show which nodes can be modified. The 
programmer must understand that nodes marked as 
mutable must be fully defined in the application predicates  
(see section 6.2.2), but in most other respects the semantics 
of bidirectional processing are hidden from the template 
programmer, who is still able to think of the reversible 
template as little more than a ‘select and publish’ script. 
(Limitations to processing transparency are illustrated in 
sections 5.3 and discussed in section 8.3.) 
One notable feature of this fragment is the relative lack 
of constraint checking. In this application the two 
component values in the tag are known types, the first 
corresponding to a class of a known stereotype, with a 
navigable association to the class in which the tag appears, 
and the second to an operation within that class. It would 
be quite straightforward to use the template to check that 
these values correspond to correct types. However, there 
are good reasons for avoiding these checks at this stage. 
Firstly, the template is specific to the tool that generated 
the XML input, but given that the template processor 
delivers tool-independent predicates, the type checking 
could be coded once, in the application, rather than 
separately for each supported tool. The application is able 
to give meaningful messages about type problems in the 
application domain, because the predicates adequately 
describe the model from an application perspective. For 
example, if a predicate specified a security access 
permission to a non-existent user role, this problem could 
be meaningfully described to the user. 
This argument also mitigates against the use of the 
UML Object Constraint Language (OCL) for application-
specific type checking, since constraints written within the 
UML will be specific to a proprietary UML metamodel 
and file structure. Of course, there is likely to be valuable 
type-checking within the UML model for constraints that 
are not related to the analysis domain, and which may not 
be fully exposed to the application.  
There is also a second consideration, which is that in its 
normal operation the template processor will often fail to 
unify, since it will attempt to match nodes and predicates 
that are not compatible. If constraint checking is included 
in the template, then badly constructed types will not unify, 
and will not be passed to the application. However, the 
result of a constraint failure in a template processor is 
silence, whereas constraint failures in the application can 
generate meaningful type warnings to the user. The 
programming philosophy is therefore to specify the 
minimum in the template language, consistent with 
establishing an accurate relationship between the XML 
input and application predicates, and to carry out more 
application-specific type checking in the application. 
5.3 A contrasting XML metamodel 
The previous sections provided examples of template 
clauses from a real application; since this application 
supports multiple UML tools, it is possible to contrast 
Table 13 with the template for a different UML source. 
This provides insight into the extent of the differences 
between proprietary metamodels, and the role of the 
template in hiding the application from such differences. 
Table 14 delivers the same predicate to the application 
as Table 13, but for XML documents produced from a 
different proprietary design tool. Both tools support UML 
2 and use XMI as a common exchange format; they are not 
identified here since they are both are well regarded 
propriety tools, and identifying them would invite 
comparisons based only on one aspect of their metamodels. 
The template in Table 13 extracts a complete tag from 
one area of the model, and then looks up the referenced 
xml.id to obtain the associated class name. The structure of 
the XMI corresponding to the template in Table 14 is quite 
different; it is the tag definition, not the class definition 
that is identified with the xmi.id. Here, the document is 
first searched for a tag specification, in order to extract the 
xmi.id for the required tag name (“PermitAccess”). The 
instance of a tag is in a sub-tree within the UML:Class to 
which it is attached; the tag information is extracted, and 
the template finally checks that the tag identifier (xmi.id) in 
the class matches the required definition. 
This example illustrates the power of the reversible 
template. From the user perspective both source tools carry 
out the same function, and both export XMI models. The 
metamodels are radically different, but these differences 
are only visible in the template definition; from the 
application perspective the difference is hidden, and the 
analysis tool is able to use either source. 
Table 14 Mutable document node for a contrasting XMI source 
<tpl.specification> 
  ... 
  <UML:TagDefinition> 
    <tpl.match nodeType="ATTRIBUTE_NODE" attribute="name" position=”PERMIT_ACCESS”> 
    <tpl.match nodeType="ATTRIBUTE_NODE" attribute="xmi.id" position=”XMI.ID”> 
  <tpl.selectRegisteredNode node="UML:Class"> 
    <tpl.match nodeType="ATTRIBUTE_NODE" attribute="name" position=”IN_CLASS”>  
    <UML:ModelElement.taggedValue tpl.mutable="TRUE">       
      <UML:TaggedValue> 
        <UML:TaggedValue.dataValue> 
          <tpl.match nodeType="MULTIPLE_TEXT" tagIndex="0" length="2" position=”VAL_1”> 
          <tpl.match nodeType="MULTIPLE TEXT" tagIndex="1" length="2" position=”VAL 2” >           
        <tpl.moveUp steps="1">  
          <UML:TaggedValue.type> 
            <UML:TagDefinition>         
              <tpl.match nodeType="ATTRIBUTE_NODE" attribute="xmi.idref"   
         position=”XMI.ID”  publish="TRUE"> 
  … 
To support this metamodel it is necessary to regenerate 
tag definitions, as well as the instances of tags. The 
fragment in Table 14 regenerates instances of tags, 
provided the definitions are present. Roundtrip clauses in 
the template language are executed in the order in which 
they appear, so in the complete template there is an 
additional clause to extract or regenerate tag definitions. 
The template language therefore has the ability to 
regenerate models where mutable nodes are mutually 
dependent, as opposed to simply add or subtract leaf nodes. 
However, in these more complex examples, bidirectional 
processing is not fully transparent to the template 
programmer, who must take into account the order in 
which the XML model will be regenerated.  
6  A Template Processor 
The previous sections describe the XRound template 
language; this section describes a practical template 
processor which is able to interpret the language, and 
provide the operations of validation, import and export 
(round-tripping) of models. The programmatic interface to 
the template processor is described, showing how template 
processing is integrated with an application, followed by a 
brief account of its architecture. This section aims to 
demonstrate the feasibility of practical processors to 
support the XRound language, rather than give a full 
account of implementation issues. 
6.1 Template Processor Overview 
The XMLSource template processor is a Java class that 
encapsulates an XML file and allows its client application 
to import and export predicates from and to an XML 
document. The design of the processor is given in Fig. 4; 
although its initial application was to roundtrip XMI 
documents, there is nothing XMI-specific in XRound, or in 
this processor. 
 
 
XMLSource
+ (File, File, XMLMessage)
+ transform(PublishHandler) : void
+ saveAs(ExportInterface, File) : void
+ getWorkingFile() : File
+ isValid() : boolean
«interface»
ExportInterface
+ getPredicateIterator(String[]) : Iterator
«interface»
PublishHandler
+ publishPredicate(String[]) : void
«interface»
XMLMessage
+ writeXMLMessage(String) : void
XMLSource
 
Fig. 4 XMLSource: an XRound Template Processor 
The XRound processor is a single class, XMLSource, 
which encapsulates an XML file whose name is provided 
to the constructor. Three interfaces are defined in the 
package, and these call-backs are provided by the 
application client to allow the processor to import and 
export predicates.  
Predicates are represented as arrays of Strings, such as 
{class,foo}, which describe features in the XML input that 
are required by the application. The processor supports 
three transform operations: validation, import and export. 
(See Section 3 for further detail.) 
Validation. Validation allows the user to check that the 
template and the input model are compatible. The 
XMLSource constructor takes three parameters, the 
reference XML File, the Template File, and a message 
interface. (The Java File class encapsulates a file name.) 
The message interface is used to pass certain error 
messages back to the application, particularly those that 
report inconsistencies between the template and the XML 
input. A message interface is used in preference to a 
thrown exception, since it allows a sequence of messages 
to be reported during processing, which is valuable during 
template debugging. 
The initialization process parses both the Template and 
the XML input file, and executes the section of the 
template which is used to validate the input. Methods are 
provided to allow the client application to check that the 
validation was successful (isValid) and to retrieve the 
name of the XML input file (getWorkingFile). 
Import. A single method, transform, runs the import 
process, which extracts predicates from the XML input, as 
specified by the template, and publishes them to the client 
application. As each predicate is constructed the 
PublishHandler interface provided by the application 
client is called to transfer the predicate to the client. 
Export. A single output method (saveAs) is provided to 
export predicates from the client application to a named 
XML file. The output filename is provided by the client, 
together with an interface (ExportInterface) which allows 
XMLSource to obtain predicates from the application. This 
callback is slightly more functional than the other 
interfaces, but is still straightforward: the client is provided 
with an incomplete predicate, which is an array of Strings, 
some elements of which may be null. The client responds 
with an iterator, which encapsulates predicates matching 
this template.  
The saveAs method updates the reference XML input 
with predicates obtained from the application, and then 
writes the result to the named file. File naming strategies 
and backup files, etc, are determined by the client 
application. 
Because the input XML is encapsulated by the template 
processor, there is no need for the complete XML tree to 
be exported to the application; the transformation therefore 
includes only the features required by the application. 
An important feature of the template processor is its 
straightforward client interface; this is a direct result of the 
reversible template model, since: 
• The application needs to obtain only the predicates that 
it requires for its function, the rest of the input XML 
remains hidden. 
• The application interface is independent of the tool used 
to generate the XML: any tool differences are accounted 
for in the template. 
• The template includes an explicit validation section that 
is run at initialisation. 
A discussion of how the three operations relate to the 
template specification is presented in section 3.3; the 
remainder of this section describes implementation issues. 
6.2 Template Processor Implementation 
The template processor is based around a core recursive 
structure which alternates between navigating the template, 
then implementing template instructions, often by 
traversing the document tree; this core architecture is 
shown in Fig 5. 
The document which is traversed by the template 
processor is always the XML input model, and this model 
is retained until it is updated by round-trip processing. In 
this way any elements of the XML input model that are not 
transferred to and from the application as predicates are 
retained.  
Each of the main public methods (the constructor, 
transform() and saveAs() ) sets a processing mode and then 
calls processDocument() once for each clause to be 
processed. The processing modes used for each method 
and clause type are listed in table 15.  
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Fig. 5 Template processor core architecture 
Table 15 Processing modes and associated clause types 
Method Clause Mode 
XMLSource 
constructor 
validate validation 
transform() structure forward 
transform() roundtrip forward 
saveAs() roundtrip clean 
saveAs() roundtrip reverse 
testPublish() see text reverse2 
 
The processing modes primarily condition the behaviour 
of the testPublish() method, which is used to check if a 
unification has succeeded, together with some 
modifications to the behaviour of the core recursive cycle, 
most notably success and failure handling.  
The processing of validation and forward modes is 
straightforward; the processDocument() method reads the 
header, constraints, and declarations from a template 
clause, builds the recursive context and then calls 
processStructureTemplate() for each specification within 
the clause. The processing is carried out by a recursive 
loop between processStructureTemplate(), which selects 
the next template node, and processStructureDocument(), 
which carries out the template instruction, often by 
selecting the next position in the XML input document.  
The calling parameters of these methods are identical, 
consisting of a recursive context which represents the 
current position in the combined template and document 
trees; the main elements of this context are: 
• the processing mode; 
• the template tree node; 
• the document tree node; 
• the Predicate object (see unification, below); 
• the current debug message; and 
• a node list (see roundtrip processing, below). 
processStructureDocument() is essentially a case 
statement for each of the possible template operations, 
each of which is implemented in a separate method; the 
only method of architectural interest is testPublish(), which 
is invoked whenever a publish attribute is encountered in 
the template. Its behaviour depends on mode. In validation 
and forward modes it checks for a completed unification, 
and if this succeeds it either returns success, or publishes a 
predicate to the application using a callback interface, 
respectively. Interesting aspects of the implementation are 
the management of unification, and the use of the core 
processing architecture for round-trip processing.  
6.2.1 Unification 
Unification is straightforwardly encapsulated in an inner 
class (Predicate), with the number of unification slots set 
by its constructor. Class methods include: 
• addConstraint: specify a constraint on a slot; 
• addvalue: unify a given value with a slot; 
• getPredicate: unify and return predicate; 
• indexMatch: check index between pair of slots. 
In general, unification is performed as each new value is 
added, returning success or failure; however, the use of the 
getPredicate() accessor allows the class to defer the 
unification of constraints, including the generation of 
unique names, if required. 
6.2.2 Round-trip processing 
Round-trip processing updates the XML document to be 
compatible with the model held by the application; model 
updating is only carried out in areas of the model that are 
identified by nodes in roundtrip template clauses which are 
marked as mutable. Two passes of the complete template 
are made, the first cleans the retained XML input 
document by removing mutable nodes, and the second 
(reverse) regenerates any such nodes that are present in the 
application model. All other elements of the XMI input 
document are preserved. This imposes a constraint on the 
template programmer, that the contents of mutable nodes 
must be preserved in the application predicates. 
Constructing the processing in this way allows the 
application to signal that nodes should be completely 
deleted from the model, simply by deleting the relevant 
predicate(s). 
In both modes, the processStructureDocument() method 
records the context of mutable document nodes; this node 
list is built as part of the recursive context, and eventually 
passed to the testPublish() method. Essentially, nodes are 
recorded as potentially mutable, but no action is taken until 
unification is confirmed. 
In the clean mode, testPublish() uses the node list to 
build a list of document nodes to be deleted; they are 
actually deleted after the whole template has been 
processed.  
A similar process is used to regenerate mutable modes; 
however, the generation of new nodes is slightly more 
complex. If testPublish() determines that a unification is 
successful, then the recursive context contains a node list 
which must be created. This is achieved by re-entering the 
main recursive loop, once for each new node, using the 
mode Reverse2; this provides processStructureDocument() 
with sufficient information to rebuild any nodes that are 
missing. This re-entrant recursive structure has proved to 
be an elegant and economical solution for reverse 
processing. 
7. A Practical Application in 
Security Analysis 
The XRound language and template processor have 
been successfully used to support security analysis of 
UML models. This section briefly describes this practical 
experience.  
7.1 The application background 
The Security Analyst Workbench (SAW) supports risk-
based security analysis and design; analysis, is concerned 
with determining the risks in a system, and security design, 
is the specification of control requirements that mitigate 
those risks. SAW is part of a suite of models, analysis 
methods and tools known as the Security Design Analysis 
framework (SeDAn) [27]; the framework will not be 
described here, however, its use in industrial applications 
[26] necessitated competent tool support. 
Security risks are potential threat paths through a 
system, from attackers to assets; to carry out risk analysis it 
is necessary to assemble a single system model, which 
includes: 
• the functional design of the system; 
• security requirements (such as access controls) that 
specify how the system is protected; 
• system users, including administrative organizations; 
• security goals, and unwanted outcomes for specific 
assets (e.g. loss of integrity of a particular data item), 
and their impact in business terms; and 
• attackers, their goals, and the likelihood of attack. 
One objective of the Security Analyst Workbench is to 
integrate security design with standard system engineering 
practice; for this reason these elements of the system 
model are divided into three main categories: 
• the functional design, which is a standard engineering 
design in UML, usually in the form of a Platform 
Independent Model; 
• security requirements, which are attached to 
components in the system design and become 
specialised properties of the design model; and 
• the security environment (attackers, security goals, asset 
concerns etc) which is specified in an auxiliary model. 
The security analyst uses a standard functional system 
design, builds a complementary specification of the 
security environment, and then analyses the resulting 
model for risks. Security requirements are specified to 
manage the risks, and these become part of the functional 
specification to be implemented.   
The specification of security requirements is a design 
activity: the process of establishing a protection strategy 
involves choices about the placement and type of security 
requirements; risk analysis informs that choice, it does not 
automate it. As a result, SAW provides a richer and more 
interactive set of user functions than are suggested by 
‘analysis’, and many of these functions are concerned with 
interactively managing security requirements.  
There are therefore two equally important functions for 
the security analysis tool: risk analysis and requirements 
management. The latter involves creating and testing new 
model properties within the analysis tool, resulting in the 
need to update the UML documentation.   Security analysis 
in practice [26] and requirements specification [28] are 
described in more detail elsewhere.  
7.2 Model Management Requirements 
The Security Analyst Workbench (SAW) is a 
specialised analysis tool, which uses a system design 
expressed in UML and created using a separate design 
tool. Security requirements are set and modified during 
analysis, and these must eventually be reflected in the 
reference system design.  
The issues exposed in this way will be common to many 
specialized analytic tools; they include: 
• a separate specialized and ephemeral model on which 
the actual analysis is conducted; 
• the need for model management facilities within the 
analysis tool; and  
• the need to propagate property changes back into the 
primary UML documentation. 
The solution adopted for SAW is to use XMI as its 
persistent model format, and furthermore, to use whatever 
UML metamodel is native to the user’s development 
environment. The import and export mechanism between 
XMI and the analysis model must be readily adapted to 
different UML sources, and must ensure consistency in the 
round-trip operation. These requirements are well 
supported by, respectively, a template processor, and a 
single template specification that can be used for 
processing in both directions, thus ensuring round-trip 
consistency.  
The XMLSource template processor has successfully 
supported SAW through several iterations, in which new 
functionality has been added, including new model 
properties and new templates for different proprietary 
UML design tools.  Our practical experience is that even 
well regarded tools conforming to XMI may have 
considerable differences in their metamodels, confirming 
the need for an import/roundtrip mechanism that decouples 
the application from the source metamodel.  A practical 
example of this problem is presented in section 5. 
Given the performance management features in 
XRound, the performance of the template processor is 
dominated by the time taken to open and read XML 
documents, rather than template processing. From the 
overall system perspective the user experience is 
considerably enhanced by using a reversible template: 
model properties can be changed and tested within the 
analysis tool. If, instead, a unidirectional import process 
was used, it would be necessary to change properties in the 
UML design tool and re-transform the model for analysis 
to evaluate the effect of each change; this would represent 
a considerable processing overhead to change and test 
model properties, which is inconsistent with the need for 
iterative analysis.  
The design philosophy for XRound was to create a 
minimal set of features consistent with a practical language 
and add more complex (e.g. higher order) features if they 
could be shown to be necessary. The design iterations in 
SAW have tested the language specification by adding new 
model properties, requiring different parts of the source 
metamodels to be regenerated, and by accommodating 
different proprietary source metamodels. This has been 
achieved without significant addition to the core language, 
although it has been necessary to remove some 
implementation restrictions in the template processor3. The 
programming philosophy of minimising the type checking 
carried out by the template (see section 5.2 for discussion 
and rationale) is perhaps one reason why a relatively 
simple template language has proved sufficient. 
In summary, practical experience has demonstrated the 
need for a programmable approach to roundtrip 
transformation of models, and the effectiveness of the 
XRound template language.  
7.3 Worked Example 
This section provides a simple worked example in 
which a Platform Independent Model is enhanced with a 
description of its security environment, a security policy 
established and tested, and the UML system model updated 
with the resulting security requirements. The purpose of 
the example is to illustrate how reversible processing is 
used to support a security workflow.  For readers interested 
in more technical details, accounts of requirements 
modelling [28] and analysis [29] are published elsewhere, 
and a full account of the metamodels, profiles and security 
requirements is also available [27]. 
The system fragment used in this example is shown in 
Fig. 6; it specifies an office system, with business data 
(OfficeData) which is managed by a service 
(OfficeServer). In this example the service provides only 
one operation (update), to allow a manager to modify the 
data. The service is normally accessed by an internal client 
(Home) to which business managers have access. The 
complete system also has connectivity to the internet, 
which may include services (FreeSoftware) that provide 
access to software of unknown provenance (Games) and 
publicly available clients (PublicAccess). Of course, the 
actual system would have many more operations, this 
limited functionality is chosen to limit the number of 
security requirements needed for the sake of example. 
The stereotypes in this system denote entities that 
provide a business service (<<service>>), services that 
may be directly accessed by users (<<client>>), and an 
association stereotype (<<managed>>4) that indicates that 
data is bound to a particular service.  
This is a Platform Independent Model, since no 
commitment to an implementation has been given: the 
services could be implemented by people, business 
departments or, more usually, some form of information 
system. Specifically, no binding between services and 
platforms or platform types is assumed.  
                                                          
3 For example, the first release of XMISource did not support 
tpl.moveup within mutable nodes. 
4 This is used to distinguish between different objectives for data 
protection in security modelling, but does not play a part in this 
example, because the characterisation of different threat paths 
is not described here, see references for more information. 
«client»
PublicAccess
+ refresh(String) : String
«client»
Home
+ refresh(String) : String
«service»
FreeSoftware
+ getSoftware(String) : Games
«service»
OfficeServer
+ update(OfficeData) : boolean
Games OfficeData
«manages» «manages»
 
Fig. 6 Example System 
 
Security risk analysis involves finding paths from 
attackers to assets of concern, where the concern is to 
avoid a particular unwanted outcome. Before the 
security characteristics of features of this system can be 
analysed it is necessary to specify the security 
environment in which the system operates, including the 
identification of potential attackers and associated 
assets. The security environment effectively forms the 
baseline assumptions for the security analysis, so it must 
also be recorded with the system documentation in the 
UML model; an example of such an environmental 
specification is given in Fig. 7. 
 
«userRole»
Guest
«organisation»
HomeOrg
«organisation»
Public
«securityGoal»
BusinessIntegrity
«assetConcern»
DataIntegrity
«userAttack»
FakeData
«userRole»
Manager
Access::
OfficeData
 
Fig. 7 Security Environment 
 
Fig. 7 specifies the organisations (the target business 
HomeOrg, and the Public), and their associated user roles 
(Manager, Guest). This system has a single security goal 
(BusinessIntegrity) which is linked via an association class 
(DataIntegrity)5 to the only asset of concern (OfficeData), 
which appears in the system model. Much of this 
information is usually available in system requirements 
                                                          
5 The purpose of the association class is not evident in this 
example; it carries attributes that are specific to assets or 
groups of assets, such as the impact of the attack.  
documents or use cases, and generally does not need to be 
created specifically for security purposes; however, the 
attackers also need to be identified together with their 
objectives. In this example the Guest user may attack the 
BusinessIntegrity goal, meaning that any assets linked to 
that goal may become the target of attack. Attacks may 
originate with user roles, organisations or outsiders, all of 
which can be modelled similarly.  
It is evident from the security environment and the 
system design that some security requirements will be 
needed, in particular access controls that prevent Guest 
users of the PublicAccess client using the update() 
operation to modify OfficeData. Since the system model 
has not been bound to particular platforms it is also 
necessary to record the assumption that the Home client is 
situated within the business, specifically that Guest users 
do not have access to this management client. This will 
become a constraint on how the system is bound to 
platforms, and is described as Deployment Constraint. In 
this example the constraint must specify that the Home 
client is never bound to a Public platform – i.e. one 
administered outside the business.  
This informal analysis suggests the need for the security 
policy given in table 16. 
Table 16 Initial Security Policy 
Home 
 Deployment Constraint: Public 
OfficeServer 
 Access Constraint: from PublicAccess 
 client to any operation 
The security analyst has a choice at this point, the policy 
can be recorded manually in the system design, by adding 
tags that will in due course constrain the implementation 
and operation of the system, or they can be added using the 
security analysis application. The latter is provided with an 
interactive capability for setting and changing policies, so 
this is often more convenient, but either is possible.  
The next step is to check that this policy is sufficient, 
and for that purpose the XMI representation of the UML 
model is imported into the analysis tool, using a template 
as described in this paper. The XMI6 representation of this 
example contained 1479 lines of XML, but the security 
related elements were encoded in just 50 predicates. The 
XMI contains a wealth of information about the specific 
UML tool, its working properties, and diagram layouts that 
are not needed for security analysis. 
The security analysis tool is able to carry out a range of 
different analysis functions, but the most basic is to 
determine if there are any threat paths in the system.  This 
analysis discovered an unanticipated threat, shown in table 
17.  
 
 
                                                          
6 This XMI was generated using the Enterprise Architect UML 
tool. 
Table 17 Analysis Result 
DataIntegrity path trace: 
Operation PublicAccess.refresh(in)   
called from: Guest 
Operation FreeSoftware.getSoftware(in)              
called from: PublicAccess 
OperationFreeSoftware.getSoftware(return)           
called from: Home 
Operation OfficeServer.update(in)               
called from: Home 
Managed Data OfficeServer/OfficeData 
Essentially, Guest users are able to modify Games 
software, which is then imported by the Home client, and 
is able to subvert the integrity of the business system: a 
relatively common attack scenario.  
Normally, access policies are located at the service and 
manage the access from remote clients; however, this 
threat requires the Home client to ensure that it does not 
access potentially dangerous external data: the constraint 
must be enforced by the client, not the service. This type of 
policy is distinguished as a RefuseToAccess requirement, 
because its implementation is likely to be different from 
normal access control policies.  
The analyst adds the RefuseToAccess policy to the 
model using the interactive policy editor which is part of 
the security analysis tool, and then re-runs the threat 
analysis to check that there are no remaining threat paths in 
the system.  Practical experience has resulted in both the 
policy management and analysis functions being combined 
within a single analysis tool, because in complex systems 
the analyst may need to try a range of different security 
strategies before deciding on a coherent policy. In many 
proprietary UML tools, exporting a UML model as XMI is 
relatively slow, so testing security policy variations by 
changing and exporting the UML model is not consistent 
with an interactive security design workflow. 
When the analyst has decided that the security policy is 
appropriate, the requirements established in the analysis 
tool are re-integrated into the UML model, using the same 
reversible template that was used to extract the data for 
analysis. 
Security requirements established in the security 
analysis tool are added as tags to relevant classes within 
the UML model, in order to constrain their 
implementation. The tags resulting from the security 
requirements described above are are given in table 18. 
(Access permissions are also added to the other services 
for completeness, but this is outside the scope of this 
discussion.) 
Table 18 Security Tags Added to System Model 
Home Client 
NoDeploy = Public 
RefusetoAccess=FreeSoftware.getSoftware 
OfficeServer 
PermitAccess=Home, ALL_OPERATIONS 
... 
The forgoing example has described the security 
analysis and design cycle. In this case three different types 
of security requirement have been recorded in the PIM, 
and these are used in different ways in the subsequent 
implementation lifecycle. Deployment constraints limit 
how the PIM can be bound to concrete platforms; access 
permissions will be carried forward in the implementation 
and be issued as policies to be interpreted by access 
management infrastructure; and Access Refusals are 
similarly carried forward to be used as infrastructure 
policies, but are distinguished since they will be 
implemented by a different architectural binding.   
This example has illustrated how security analysis and 
design is integrated into Model Driven Development, and 
how this is facilitated by the reversible template language. 
The analysis and design process described here has been 
implemented and used in practice; the automated use of 
these security requirements within the development 
lifecycle is planned as future work. 
8. Limitations 
Practical limits arise from variability in XML source 
metamodels, the scope of the template language, and the 
implementation of the template processor. 
8.1 Source metamodels 
Differences in metamodels between UML tools is a well 
known problem, was one of the main motivating factors in 
the design of XRound, and has been mentioned at several 
points in the paper. Different templates are required for 
different UML tools, but the use of a reversible template 
isolates the application logic from this variability. The 
XML import behaviour of tools can also vary in detail; for 
example, some tools regenerate missing xmi.id fields, 
where others fail. The design of a template may therefore 
go beyond the need to understand (part of) the source 
metamodel. Although this is an inconvenience, it has not 
yet proved a major problem, or required tool-specific 
language features. 
8.2 Language features 
There are two aspects of the language that could be 
considered as candidates for enhancement: 
• the performance management mechanism; and 
• the unification scheme. 
The performance management mechanism is essentially 
a cache, so it is natural to ask if the cache could be built 
transparently, without user involvement. Such a 
mechanism would be feasible; however, allowing explicit 
performance management in the language allows finer 
control by the user than would be possible in an automated 
system. For example, an automated cache would need to be 
conservative in the sense that it would need to cache all 
possible nodes of a given type, whereas it may be possible 
for a programmer to be more selective. In summary, 
automated caching is a possible enhancement to the 
template processor, but even with such a feature it is 
desirable to retain the performance management elements 
in the language. 
The unification scheme could be enhanced to allow 
more sophisticated forms of logic; for example: 
• allowing more general logical constraints on unification; 
and  
• regular expressions for matching or extracting of 
elements of an attribute or text value.  
More general unification constraints were not designed 
into the language at the outset because of the programming 
philosophy, discussed in section 5.2. In brief, the 
programming objective is to avoid complex type checking 
in the template, since it is better implemented in the 
application.  
In XML the fields (attributes and text fields) should 
already be atomic; however, it was evident from the first 
applications that the atomicity of XML fields cannot be 
relied on, so some mechanism is required to identify 
components within fields. Any component matching 
mechanism, however, must also be able to allow the fields 
to be incrementally recreated, when the XML is 
regenerated, and this is not a property of an arbitrary 
regular expression. The simple component parsing 
approach in the language was designed to allow roundtrip 
reconstruction of such fields. The design of regular 
expression languages that allow incremental pattern 
building as well as extraction is an open question.  
In brief, it is possible to envisage new language features 
that offer more logical complexity; however, any such 
features need to be reversible, and their design is not 
therefore straightforward. Practical experience has not yet 
indicated the need for such features.  
8.3 Template processor 
 The problem of interdependent mutable nodes was 
mentioned in section 5.3; in this example a tag definition 
within a UML class could not be created unless there was a 
tag declaration elsewhere in the XML document to bind a 
tag name to an xmi.id. The language is able to support 
constructs of this type, so the models created in the 
roundtrip can be modified in structure, not merely by the 
addition or removal of leaf nodes. However, this process is 
not transparent to the programmer, who must order the 
roundtrip clauses to ensure that the document can be built 
incrementally.  
It would be desirable for the template processor to 
implement a more transparent approach to rebuilding more 
complex models; unfortunately there are open technical 
problems in achieving this. For example, it is not clear that 
the detection and resolution of cyclic dependencies 
between mutable nodes is feasible within reasonable 
complexity bounds. Future development in this problem 
area is likely to inform the template processor, rather than 
the language itself. 
9. Conclusion 
XRound adds a new dimension to the template 
processing of XML models: the ability to transform data in 
both directions with a single descriptive template. 
Reversible template processing solves the problem of 
maintaining independence between XML source 
documents and analytic tools, while retaining the benefit of 
easily scripted transformations. Reversible templates could 
provide a clean implementation mechanism for 
bidirectional transformations specified in QVT, and could 
help in the definition and implementation of model 
merging languages as well. 
This paper outlines the requirements of specialised 
analytic tools, the theory behind reversible templates, and 
presents a mature template language, XRound. This 
language is supported by a template processor, and 
includes performance management and debugging 
facilities. 
The examples presented here illustrate the extent that 
the underlying semantics of unification and reversible 
transformation are hidden from the template programmer, 
who is usually able to think of the template as a ‘select and 
publish’ script. 
The language and its processor have been used in 
practice to support security analysis. The application is a 
specialised analytic tool which supports the rigorous 
security risk analysis of UML models, usually PIMs, and 
provides an environment in which the user can 
interactively set and test security requirements. Properties 
established during analysis are re-integrated into the 
engineering documentation (i.e., the UML models) using a 
bidirectional transformation specified by the XRound 
template language. The use of XRound has isolated the 
need to support different source metamodels from the 
analysis application. 
Practical experience to date has not indicated any major 
weaknesses in the language or the processor; however, 
section 8 discusses a number of possible enhancements to 
the language or processor, such as the use of regular 
expressions to match XML fields, or improving the 
transparency of bidirectional processing. Because of the 
requirements of bidirectional processing these options are 
research questions, rather than simple language 
enhancements, highlighting the need for further research 
into reversible programming constructs. 
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